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Abstract. A proof of sequential work allows a prover to convince a
resource bounded verifier that the prover invested a substantial amount
of sequential time to perform some underlying computation. Proofs of se-
quential work have many applications including time-stamping, blockchain
design, and universally verifiable CPU benchmarks. Mahmoody, Moran
and Vadhan (ITCS 2013) gave the first construction of proofs of sequen-
tial work in the random oracle model though the construction relied on
expensive depth-robust graphs. In a recent breakthrough, Cohen and
Pietrzak (EUROCRYPT 2018) gave a more efficient construction that
does not require depth-robust graphs. In each of these constructions, the
prover commits to a labeling of a directed acyclic graph G with N nodes
and the verifier audits the prover by checking that a small subset of la-
bels are locally consistent, e.g., Lv = H(Lv1 , . . . , Lvδ ), where v1, . . . , vδ
denote the parents of node v. Provided that the graph G has certain
structural properties (e.g., depth-robustness), the prover must produce a
long H-sequence to pass the audit with non-negligible probability. An H-
sequence x0, x1 . . . xT has the property that H(xi) is a substring of xi+1
for each i, i.e., we can find strings ai, bi such that xi+1 = ai ·H(xi) · bi.
In the parallel random oracle model, it is straightforward to argue that
any attacker running in sequential time T − 1 will fail to produce an
H-sequence of length T except with negligible probability – even if the
attacker submits large batches of random oracle queries in each round. In
this paper, we introduce the parallel quantum random oracle model and
prove that any quantum attacker running in sequential time T − 1 will
fail to produce an H-sequence except with negligible probability – even
if the attacker submits a large batch of quantum queries in each round.
The proof is substantially more challenging and highlights the power of
Zhandry’s recent compressed oracle technique (CRYPTO 2019).
Keywords: Parallel Quantum Random Oracle Model · Proof of Sequen-
tial Work · H-Sequence · Compressed Oracle
1 Introduction
As we make progress towards the development of quantum computers, it is
imperative to understand which cryptographic primitives can be securely and
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efficiently instantiated in a post-quantum world. In this work, we consider the
security of proofs of sequential work against quantum adversaries.
A proof of sequential work (PoSW) [MMV13,CP18,AKK+19,DLM19] is a
protocol for proving that one spent significant sequential computation work to
validate some statement x. One motivation for a proof of sequential work is in
time-stamping e.g., if Bob can produce a valid proof πx that N sequential steps
were spent to validate x, then Bob can prove that he must have known about x
at least time Ω(N) seconds in the past. A verifier should be able to validate the
proof πx quickly, i.e., in time polylog(N).
Mahmoody et al. [MMV13] gave the first construction of a proof of sequential
work in the random oracle model. Their construction was based on labeling a
depth-robust graph, i.e., given a random oracle H and a directed acyclic graph
G = (V = [N ], E) with N nodes and an initial input x, we can compute labels
L1, . . . , LN , where the label of the source node is L1 = H(1, x) and an internal
node v with parents v1, . . . , vδ has label Lv = H(v, Lv1 , . . . , Lvδ).
The prover commits to labels L′1, . . . , L
′
N (a cheating prover might commit
to the wrong labels) and then the verifier selects a random subset S ⊂ [N ] of
|S| = c challenge nodes. For each challenge node v ∈ S with parents v1, . . . , vδ,
the prover reveals L′v along with L
′
v1 , . . . , L
′
vδ and the verifier checks that v is
locally consistent, i.e., L′v = H(v, L
′
v1 , . . . , L
′
vδ
). If we let R denote the subset
of locally inconsistent nodes, then the verifier will accept with probability at
most (1− |R|/N)c. The proof can (optionally) be made non-interactive using
the Fiat-Shamir paradigm.
Mahmoody et al. [MMV13] selected G such that G was ǫ-extremely depth-
robust3, meaning that for any set R ⊆ [N ] of locally inconsistent nodes, there
is a directed path of length T + 1 = (1 − ǫ)N − R. This path P = v0, . . . , vT
corresponds to an H-sequence of length T where an H-sequence is any sequence
of strings x0, . . . , xT with the property that H(xi) is a substring of xi+1 for
each i < T . Note that the labels L′v0 , . . . , L
′
vT have this property. In the classical
parallel random oracle model, it is relatively straightforward to prove that any
algorithm running in T − 1 rounds and making at most q queries in total fails to
produce a H-sequence except with probability Ω˜ (q22−λ) when H : {0, 1}δλ →
{0, 1}λ outputs binary strings of length λ [CP18].
The ǫ-extreme depth-robust graphs used in the construction of Mahmoody
et al. [MMV13] were quite expensive, having indegree δ = Ω˜(logN). Alwen
et al. [ABP18] showed how to construct ǫ-extreme depth-robust graphs with
indegree just O (logN) though the hidden constants were quite large. Cohen
and Pietrzak [CP18] gave an efficient (practical) construction that avoids depth-
robust graphs entirely4.
3 A DAG G is said to be ǫ-extremely depth-robust is it is (e, d)-depth robust for any
e, d > 0 such that e + d ≤ (1 − ǫ)N where N is the number of nodes in G. Recall
that a DAG G = (V,E) is (e, d)-depth robust if for any subset S ⊆ V with |S| ≤ e
there exists a path of length d in G− S.
4 Although their graph is “weighted” depth robust. In particular, there is a weighting
function w : V → R≥0 with the property that
∑
v
w(v) ∈ O (N logN) and for any
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In all of the above constructions, security relies on the hardness of comput-
ing H-sequences of length T in sequential time T − 1. While this can be readily
established in the classical parallel random oracle model, proving that this task
is in fact hard for a quantum attacker is a much more daunting challenge. As
Boneh et al. [BDF+11] pointed out, many of the convenient properties (e.g., ex-
tractability, programmability, efficient simulation, rewinding etc.) that are used
in classical random oracle security proofs no longer apply in the quantum ran-
dom oracle model. An attacker in the (parallel) quantum random oracle model
is able to submit entangled queries, giving the attacker much more power. For
example, given y a quantum attacker can find a preimage x′ such that H(x′) = y
with just O (2λ/2) quantum random oracle queries using Grover’s algorithm. By
contrast, a classical attacker would need at least Ω(2λ) queries to a classical
random oracle. Similarly, an quantum attacker can find hash collisions with at
most O (2λ/3) queries, while a classical attacker requires Ω(2λ/2) queries. In this
paper, we aim to answer the following question:
Can a quantum attacker running in T − 1 sequential rounds produce an
H-sequence of length T?
1.1 Our Contributions
We introduce the parallel quantum random oracle model and prove that any
quantum attacker making N−1 rounds of queries cannot produce anH-sequence
of length N – except with negligible probability. This provides powerful evidence
that proof of sequential work constructions like [MMV13] and [CP18] are post-
quantum secure.
Definition 1 (H-Sequence). An H-sequence x0, x1, . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfies
the property that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ s, there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that xi+1 =
a◦H(xi)◦b. For indexing reasons, we say such an H-sequence has length s (even
though there are s+ 1 variables xi).
Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] proved that any attacker that outputs any “proof” of
sequential work that passes the verification challenge with non-negligible proba-
bility must at minimum produce a long H-sequence. To establish the security of
their construction in the classical random oracle model, they then proved that
(with high probability) any attacker requires N sequential random oracle queries
to produce an H-sequence of length N .
Our primary contribution is showing the same claim also holds in the quan-
tum random oracle model. In particular, we show that any attacker who makes
at most N − 1 sequential rounds of queries to the quantum random oracle fails
to produce an H-sequence of length N except with negligible probability. Thus,
the construction of Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] is also secure against quantum
attackers in the quantum random oracle model. While the security claims are
subset S ⊆ V with sufficiently small weight
∑
v∈S
w(v) ≤ cN the DAG G − S
contains a path of length Ω(N).
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nearly identical (modulo the addition of the word “quantum”), we stress that
from a technical standpoint, proving security in the quantum random oracle
model is significantly more challenging.
In general, there is a clear need to develop new techniques to reason about the
security of cryptographic protocols in the quantum random oracle model. Most
of the techniques that are used in classical random oracle model do not carry
over to the quantum (parallel) random oracle model [BDF+11]. For example,
if we are simulating a classical attacker, then we can see (extract) all of the
random oracle queries that the attacker, while we cannot observe a quantum
query without measuring it, which would collapse the attacker’s quantum state
might significantly alter the final output.
Warm Up Problem. As a warm up, we first prove an easier result in Theorem 1
that an attacker cannot compute HN(x) in sequential time less than N − 1 in
the parallel quantum random oracle model. Along the way we highlight some
of the key challenges that make it difficult to extend the proof to arbitrary
H-sequences.
Theorem 1. Given a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}4λ and a random input
x, any quantum attacker that makes up to q queries in each of N − 1 sequential
steps can only compute HN(x) with probability at most N
2
24λ
+ 1
24λ−N
+
√
160λN4q2T
22λ
in the quantum parallel random oracle model.
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and we defer it to Appendix A. One
can easily define a sequence of indistinguishable hybrids where in the last hybrid
the final output HN (x) is information theoretically hidden from the attacker.
In general, in hybrid i for each j ≤ i, the value Hj(x) remains information
theoretically hidden until round j. In particular, we replace the random oracle
H with a new stateful oracle H ′(·) that is almost identical to H(·), except that
if the query y = Hj(x) is submitted to H ′(·) before round j the response will be
a random unrelated λ-bit string instead of H(y).
We can argue indistinguishability of hybrids i using a result of [BBBV97]
because if j > i, then the total query magnitude of Hj(x) during round i is
negligible. Here the total query magnitude of a string y during round i is defined
as the sum of squared amplitudes on states where the attacker is querying string
y. It then follows that except with negligible probability a quantum attacker
cannot compute HN (x). The argument does rely on the assumption that the
running time T of the attacker is bounded e.g., T ≤ 2cλ for some constant c > 0.
Remaining Challenges. Proving that an attacker cannot find an H-sequence
of length N in N − 1 is significantly more challenging. One key difference is
that there are exponentially many distinct H-sequences of length N that are
consistent with the initial string x0. By contrast, when we analyze a hash chain,
each value on the chain Hj(x0) can be viewed as fixed a priori. For H-sequences,
it is not clear how one would even define a hybrid where all candidate values
of xi are information theoretically hidden because these values are not known
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a priori and there might be exponentially many such candidates. In fact, for
any 2 ≤ i ≤ N and any string y, it is likely that there exists an H-sequence
x0, . . . , xN such that y = xi.
Instead, we use a recent idea introduced by [Zha19] that views the random
oracle as a superposition of databases rather than queries. This view facilitates
intuitive simulation of quantum random oracles in a manner similar to classical
models, which provides intuitive simulation for queries and circumvents the need
to “record all possible queries”, which would give an exponential number of
possible H-sequences in our case.
Our main result is summarized in Theorem 2. We show that quantum at-
tackers running in at most N − 1 sequential steps cannot find an H-sequence of
length N with high probability.
Theorem 2. A quantum adversary that makes at most q queries over all N −
1 rounds can only find an H-sequence of length N with probability at most
4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ +
δλ
2λ .
1.2 Background and Related Work
Functions that are inherently sequential to compute are a cryptographic primi-
tive used in many applications, such as proof of sequential work [MMV13], ver-
ifiable delay functions [BBBF18], and time-lock puzzles [MMV11]. The original
construction [MMV13] used depth-robust graphs, which have found applications
in many areas of cryptography including memory-hard functions
(e.g., [AS15,AB16,ABP17,BZ17,BRZ18,ABP18,BHK+19]), proofs of replication
[Fis19,CFMJ19], and proofs of space [DFKP15,Pie19]. Recently, Cohen and
Pietrzak [CP18] show that H-sequences are difficult for a classical adversary
to compute in the classical parallel random oracle model.
The Quantum RandomOracle Model was introduced by Boneh et al. [BDF+11],
who pointed out that for any real world instantiation for the hash function H
(e.g., SHA3), one can build a quantum circuit implementing H . Thus, a quantum
attacker would have the capability of submitting quantum (entangled) queries
to the random oracleH . Quantum attacks and constructions under the quantum
random oracle model have been studied in a number of previous settings, such as
unclonable public-key quantum money [Aar09,AC13], quantum Merkle puzzles
[BS08,BHK+11], signature schemes [BZ13] and construction of random functions
[Zha12]. Boneh et al. [BDF+11] provide a separation for classic adversaries and
quantum adversaries by giving a protocol that classic adversaries cannot break
due to their inability to find collisions on a hash function. However, quantum
adversaries are able to locally produce hash collisions and consequently break
the protocol.
A natural question follows: which classic protocols are resilient against quan-
tum adversaries, or more generally, what are sufficient conditions for classic pro-
tocols to be resilient against quantum adversaries? Results by [Unr10,HSS11]
show that a classic protocol that is secure in Canetti’s Universal Composability
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framework [Can01] is also computationally or statistically secure against quan-
tum adversaries. In fact, protocols maintain their security under any context in
this framework so unfortunately, showing universally composable security is a
stronger requirement than what we should need from general protocols.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set {0, 1, . . .}, [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and [a, b] =
{a, a+ 1, . . . , b} where a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b. For a function H(x), we recursively
define HN(x) = H(HN−1(x)). We say that a non-negative function µ(x) is
negligible, if for all polynomials p(x), it holds that 0 ≤ µ(x) < 1p(x) for all
sufficiently large x. In this case, we write µ(x) = negl(x).
Given quantum states φ =
∑
αx|x〉 and ψ =
∑
βx|x〉, we define the Eu-
clidean distance between the two states to be the quantity
√∑ |αx − βx|2. The
magnitude of |x〉 in φ =∑αx|x〉 is αx and the query probability is |αx|2 – when
we measure the state φx we will observe |x〉 with probability |αx|2.
Quantum Random Oracle Model. In the (sequential) quantum random oracle
model (qROM), an adversary is given oracle access to a random hash function
H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}λ. The adversary can submit quantum states as queries to
the oracle, so that H takes as input superposition φ1, φ2, . . .. Each φi can be
expanded as φi =
∑
αi,x,y|x, y〉 so that the output is
∑
αi,x,y|x, y⊕H(x)〉. Note
that when the initial state is of the form φ =
∑
αx|x, 0w〉, then the output state
will be of the form
∑
αx|x,H(x)〉.
An Important Note About Time Complexity. In the classical parallel random
oracle model (pROM), running time is measured in terms of the number of rounds
of random oracle queries [AS15], e.g., a round i of computation ends when the
attacker AH(·) outputs a list Qi =
(
qi1, . . . , q
i
ki
)
of random oracle queries and
a new initial state σi+1 for the next round of computation. During the next
round of computation, the attacker will be AH(·) with the initial state σi+1 as
well as the answers to the random oracle queries made in the last round Ai =(
H
(
qi1
)
, . . . , H
(
qiki
))
. In this model, an attacker is allowed to perform arbitrary
computation (apart from querying the random oracle) in-between rounds for
“free” i.e., even if it takes the attacker time 2λ to compute the next batch of
random oracle queries this still only counts as a single round. Security proofs in
the pROM tend to be information theoretic in nature e.g., one can show that any
attacker making at most q random oracle queries, each query qi having length
|qi| ≤ δλ, can successfully produce a valid H-sequence of length s in at most s−1
rounds with probability at most δλ(q2+qs)/2λ [CP18]. The permissive view that
an attacker can perform arbitrary computation for free in between computation
rounds is justified because it only makes the lower-bounds stronger.
We now recall two results that bound the Euclidean distance between a
sequence of quantum queries with access to different oracles. The total variation
distance between two random variables p and q drawn from a discrete space Ω
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with corresponding probability mass functions 0 ≤ p(x), q(x) ≤ 1 is defined to
be the quantity 12
∑
x∈Ω |p(x)− q(x)|.
Lemma 1 ([BBBV97] Theorem 3.1). Two unit-length superpositions that
are within Euclidean distance ǫ will give samples from distributions that are
within total variation distance at most 4ǫ upon observation.
Let φt =
∑
x αx|x〉 be some query. Then we define the query probability
of a set S on query φt to be qS(φt) =
∑
x∈S α
2
x to be the sum of the squared
magnitudes over all states x ∈ S is made to the random oracle.
Lemma 2 ([BBBV97] Theorem 3.3). Let AQ be a quantum algorithm with
runtime T and access to oracle O. Let ǫ > 0 and S ⊆ [1, T ]× {0, 1}N be a set
of time-string pairs with
∑
(t,r)∈S qr(|φt〉) ≤ ǫ. If O′ is an oracle that answers
each query r at time t by providing the same string R, where R is independently
sampled at random), then the Euclidean distance between the final states of AQ
with access to O and AQ with access to O′ is at most
√
T ǫ.
Observe the dependency on running time T in Lemma 2. Whereas classic
adversaries may not be able to gain information over time without additional
queries to the random oracle, quantum adversaries can repeatedly increase the
magnitude of the desired state, such as using Grover’s algorithm.
We require a modification of Lemma 2 to argue the indistinguishability of the
time evolution of two superpositions with small Euclidean distance. The proof
is similar to that of Lemma 2 in [BBBV97].
Lemma 3. Let ψ0, . . . , ψT−1 be a sequence of superpositions such that each ψi
is obtained from applying a unitary time evolution operator Ui on ψi−1, i.e.,
ψi = Uiψi−1. Let φ0, . . . , φT−1 be a sequence of superpositions such that φ0 = ψ0
and for each i ≥ 1 we have φi = Uiφi−1 +Ei where ‖Ei‖22 ≤ ǫ for all i < T i.e.,
Ei =
∑
x αx,i|x〉 with
∑
x α
2
x,i ≤ ǫ. The Euclidean distance between ψT and φT
is at most T
√
ǫ.
Proof. We have φi = Uiφi−1 + Ei. We can write ψ1 = φ1 + E1 and ψ2 =
U2 ·(φ1+E1) = φ2+E2+U2 ·E1 and similarly ψ3 = φ3+E3+U3 ·E2+U3 ·U2 ·E1.
In general, ψi = φi +
∑i
j=1(Ui · . . . · Uj+1) ·Ej . Define Ej = UT−1 · . . . · Uj+1Ej
so that ψi − φi =
∑T−1
j=1 Ej and let αx,i the the associated amplitudes for Ej ,
i.e., such that Ej =
∑
x αx,i|x〉. Applying Cauchy-Schwartz, we now have
‖ψT−1 − φT−1‖22 =
∑
x
(
T−1∑
i=1
αx,i
)2
≤ T
∑
x
T−1∑
i=1
α2x,i ≤ T 2ǫ
Thus the Euclidean distance between the final states is at most T
√
ǫ. ⊓⊔
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3 H-Sequences for Quantum Attacks
Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] provide a construction for proofs of sequential work
and showed that any attacker must produce a long H-sequence in order to suc-
cessfully fool a verification algorithm by claiming a false proof of sequential work
with non-negligible probability under this construction.
For example, consider the example of using the following labeling rule to
obtain labels for nodes of a directed acyclic graph.
Definition 2 (Labeling). Let Σ = {0, 1}w. Given a directed acyclic graph
G = (V,E), we define the labeling of a node v with input x by
labv(x) =
{
H(1, x), indeg(v) = 0
H(v, labv1(x) ◦ · · · ◦ labvd(x)), 0 < indeg(v) = d,
where v1, . . . , vd are the parents of vertex v in G, according to some predeter-
mined topological order. We omit the dependency on x if the context is clear.
Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] provide a construction for proofs of sequential work
by fixing labels ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓv, i.e. via Merkle tree, and then checking the labels
for local consistency.
Definition 3 (Green/red node). For a fixed labeling ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓv, a node
v ∈ V with parents v1, . . . , vd is green if ℓv = H(v, ℓv1 ◦ ℓv2 ◦ · · · ◦ ℓvd). A node
that is not green is a red node.
Similar techniques for using green/red nodes to check for local consistency were
also used in [BGGZ19]. Note that correctness of the fixed labeling ℓi for an input
x is not required, i.e. we do not require ℓi = labi(x).
The local testing procedure of Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] rejects with high
probability if there is no long path of Ω(n) green nodes, but accepts if all nodes
are green.
Lemma 4 ([CP18]). For a fixed labeling ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓv, any path of green nodes
corresponds to an H-sequence.
Hence, a quantum adversary that can construct a fictitious proof of sequential
work could also construct an H-sequence.
3.1 Compressed Oracle Technique in the Sequential qROM
Here we introduce the compressed oracle representation introduced by Zhandry
[Zha19], which is equivalent to the standard oracle in function. However, the
difference between the compressed oracle and the regular oracle is in the encod-
ings of the oracle and query registers as queries are made to the oracles. We will
extend the ideas of this technique to the parallel qROM later on.
First, we formally define a database D. A database D is defined by D =
{(xi, yi) : i ≥ 1} where yi encodes the output on input xi with λ bits. When
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D = {} is empty, it is equivalent to viewing the random oracle as being in
superposition of all possible random oracles. After q queries, the state can be
viewed as ∑
x,y,z,D
αx,y,z|x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉
where D is a compressed dataset of at most q input/output pairs, x, y are the
query registers, and z is the adversary’s private storage.
Formally, the compressed oracle technique for the sequential qROM works as
follows. Let H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}λ be a random hash function and an adversary
is given an oracle access to H . Then we have the following observations:
– It is equivalent to view the usual random oracle mapping |x, y〉 7→ |x, y ⊕
H(x)〉 (denote as StO) as the phase oracle PhsO that maps |x, y〉 to (−1)y·H(x)|x, y〉
by applying Hadamard transforms before and after the oracle query.5
– It is also equivalent to view the oracle H as being in (initially uniform)
superposition
∑
H |H〉 where we can encode H as a binary vector of length
2m×λ encoding the λ-bit output for eachm-bit input string. Under this view
the oracle maps the state φ =
∑
x,y αx,y|x, y〉⊗
∑
H |H〉 to
∑
x,y αx,y|x, y〉⊗∑
H |H〉(−1)y·H(x).
If the attacker makes at most q queries then we can compress the oracle H
and write φ =
∑
x,y αx,y|x, y〉 ⊗
∑
D |D〉 where each dataset D ∈ {0, 1}λ×2
m
is sparse i.e., D(x) 6= ⊥ for at most q entries. Intuitively, when D(x) = ⊥,
we view the random oracle as being in a uniform superposition over potential
outputs. Moreover, we can think of the basis state |D〉 as corresponding to the
superposition
∑
H∈HD
|H〉 where HD ⊆ {0, 1}2mλ denote the set of all random
oracles that are consistent with D i.e., if H ∈ HD then for all inputs x we either
have D(x) = ⊥ or D(x) = H(x). When viewed in this way, the basis state
|D〉 encodes prior queries to the random oracle along with the corresponding
responses. We can use a compressed phase oracle CPhsO (described below) to
model how phase oracle.
Compressed Phase Oracle. To properly define a compressed phase oracle CPhsO
in the sequential qROM, a unitary local decompression procedure StdDecompx
that acts on databases was first defined in [Zha19]. Intuitively, StdDecompx de-
compresses the value of the database at position x when the database D is not
specified on x and there is a room to expand D, and StdDecompx does nothing
when there is no room for decompression. If D is already specified on x, then we
have two cases: if the corresponding y registers are in a state orthogonal to a uni-
form superposition, then StdDecompx is the identity (no need to decompress). If
the y registers are in the state of a uniform superposition, then StdDecompx re-
moves x from D. Please refer to Appendix B for a full description of StdDecompx.
5 Notice that both StO and PhsO are unitary matrices and StO = (Im ⊗
H⊗λ)PhsO(Im ⊗ H⊗λ) where Im is the identity matrix on the first m qubits and
H⊗λ is the Hadamard transform on the λ output qubits.
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Now we define StdDecomp, Increase,CPhsO′ on the computational basis states as
StdDecomp (|x, y〉 ⊗ |D〉) = |x, y〉 ⊗ StdDecompx|D〉,
Increase (|x, y〉 ⊗ |D〉) = |x, y〉 ⊗ |D〉|(⊥, 0λ)〉, and
CPhsO′ (|x, y〉 ⊗ |D〉) = (−1)y·D(x)|x, y〉 ⊗ |D〉,
where the procedure Increase appends a new register |(⊥, 0λ)〉 at the end of the
database. Note that |D〉|(⊥, 0λ)〉 is a database that computes the same partial
function as D, but the upper bound on number of points is increased by 1. Here,
we remark that we define ⊥ · y = 0 when defining CPhsO′, which implies that
CPhsO′ does nothing if (x, y) has not yet been added to the database D. Finally,
the compressed phase oracle CPhsO can be defined as follows:
CPhsO = StdDecomp ◦ CPhsO′ ◦ StdDecomp ◦ Increase,
which means that when we receive a query, we first make enough space by
increasing the bound and then decompress at x, apply the query, and then
re-compress the database. We remark that CPhsO successfully keeps track of
positions that are orthogonal to the uniform superposition only because if (x, y)
was already specified in D and the y registers are in the state of a uniform
superposition, then StdDecomp removes x from D so that CPhsO′ does nothing
as explained before and the second StdDecomp in CPhsO will revert (x, y) back
to the database.
Quantum Query Bounds with Compressed Dataset. As a warmup, we review
how Zhandry [Zha19] used his compressed oracle technique to provide a greatly
simplified proof that Grover’s algorithm is asymptotically optimal. Theorem 3
proves that the final measured database D will not contain a pre-image of 0λ
except with probability O (q2/2λ). We sketch some of the key ideas below as a
warmup and to highlight some of the additional challenges faced in our setting.
Theorem 3. [Zha19] For any adversary making q queries to CPhsO and an
arbitrary number of database read queries, if the database D is measured after
the q queries, the probability it contains a pair of the form (x, 0λ) is at most
O (q2/2λ).
We can view Theorem 3 as providing a bound for amplitudes of basis states
with a database D in a set BAD that is defined as
BAD = {D : D contains a pair of the form (x, 0λ)}.
Given a basis state |x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 with D 6∈ BAD and x 6∈ D, then the random
oracle CPhsO maps this basis state to
ψ = |x, y, z〉 ⊗ 1
2λ/2
∑
w
(−1)y·w|D ∪ (x,w)〉,
where the amplitude on states with the corresponding database D in BAD is
just 2−λ/2. We use the following notation to generalize this approach for other
purposes:
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Definition 4. For a collection of basis states S and ψ = ∑X αX |X〉, we de-
fine F2(ψ,S) =
∑
X∈S |αX |2 to denote the sum of the squared magnitudes of
the projection of ψ onto the set of basis states S. We remark that sometimes
we abuse notation and use S as a set of databases, in which case when ψ =∑
x,y,z,D αx,y,z,D|x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉, we define F2(ψ,S) =
∑
x,y,z,D :D∈S |αx,y,z,D|2.
Using this notation, we can view the proof of Theorem 3 as bounding F2(CPhsOψ,BAD)−
F2(ψ,BAD) i.e., the increase in squared amplitudes on bad states after each ran-
dom oracle query.
There are a number of challenges to overcome when directly applying this
idea to analyze H-sequences. First, we note that Theorem 3 works in the se-
quential qROM, which means that the attacker can make only one query in each
round. In our setting, the quantum attacker is allowed to make more than T
queries provided that the queries are submitted in parallel batches over T − 1
rounds. Without the latter restriction, an attacker that makes T total queries
will trivially be able to find an H-sequence, even if the attacker is not quantum,
by computing HT (x) over T rounds. We introduce the parallel quantum random
oracle model pqROM in Section 3.2 to model the attacker who submits batches
(x1, y1), . . . of random oracle queries in each round.
The second primary challenge is that we can not find a static (a priori
fixed) set BAD. A na¨ıve approach would fix BAD to be the set of databases
which contain an H-sequence of length T , but this would not allow us to bound
F2(CPhsOψ,BAD)− F2(ψ,BAD). In particular, if our state ψ after round r has
non-negligible squared amplitudes on datasets D that contain an H-sequence of
length r + 1, then it is likely that the attacker will be able to produce an H-
sequence of length T after round T − 1 — in this sense a bad event has already
occurred. In our setting, the bad sets must be defined carefully in a round-
dependent fashion r. Intuitively, we want to show that F2(CPhsO
kψ,BADr+1)−
F2(ψ,BADr) is small, where BADr contains datasets D that contain an H-
sequence of length r+1 and CPhsOk denotes a parallel phase oracle that processes
k ≥ 1 queries in each round. However, reasoning about the behavior of CPhsOk
introduces an its own set of challenges when k > 1. We address these challenges
by carefully defining sets BADr,j i.e., the bad set of states after the first j (out
of k) queries in round j have been processed. See Section 4 for more details.
3.2 Parallel Quantum Random Oracle Model pqROM
Recall that in the sequential quantum random oracle model (qROM), an ad-
versary can submit quantum states as queries to the oracle, so that a random
hash function H takes as input superposition φ1, φ2, . . . , and so on. Each φi
can be expanded as φi =
∑
αi,x,y|x, y〉 so that the output is
∑
αi,x,y|x, y ⊕
H(x)〉. Note that when the initial state is of the form φ = ∑αx|x, 0w〉, then
the output state will be of the form
∑
αx|x,H(x)〉. In the parallel quantum
random oracle model (pqROM), the adversary can make a batch of queries
q1, q2, . . . each round and receives the corresponding output for each of the
queries. More precisely, if ri is the number of queries made in round i, then
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the input takes the form |(x1, y1), . . . , (xri , yri)〉 and the corresponding output
is |(x1 ⊕H(x1), y1), . . . , (xri ⊕H(xr1), yri)〉.
We also remark that the equivalence of the standard and phase oracles that
we discussed in Section 3.1 remains true with parallelism (by applying Hadamard
transforms before and after the query); therefore, we will only consider extending
the compressed oracles only on the CPhsO by convenience.
Extending Compressed Oracle Technique to pqROM. As we mentioned before,
we would need to extend CPhsO to be able to handle parallel queries. To make
the analysis simpler, we have an approach that essentially sequentially sim-
ulates a batch of parallel queries, which is as a result equivalent to process
parallel queries at once. Consider the following example; given a state |Bi〉 =
|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉⊗|D〉, let ψ1 be the state after processing the first query
(x1, y1), and let ψ2 be the state after processing the second query (x2, y2) so that
ψ2 = CPhsO(ψ1). However, recall that CPhsO only acts on the first coordinate
and to handle the parallel query sequentially, we would need to switch the order
of the coordinates to process the second query properly. Hence, we make a slight
modification and redefine ψ2 = Swap1,2 ◦ CPhsO ◦ Swap1,2(ψ1), where
Swap1,2|(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .〉 = |(x2, y2), (x1, y1), . . .〉,
and similarly Swapi,j(·) = Swapj,i(·) swaps the positions of queries xi and xj .
Thus, we now define our parallel version of a CPhsO oracle, called as CPhsOi
which and handle i parallel queries, recursively as
CPhsOi = Swap1,i ◦ CPhsO ◦ Swap1,i ◦ CPhsOi−1,
where CPhsO1 = CPhsO. For a compact notation, we define SCPhsOi = Swap1,i◦
CPhsO ◦ Swap1,i. That is, we can interpret CPhsOi as applying SCPhsOj (essen-
tially) sequentially for j = 1, . . . , i.
We remark that there are other possible approaches in extending CPhsO to
the pqROM. For example, see Appendix C for further details regarding another
approach to extending CPhsO to the pqROM.
4 Security of PoSW in the pqROM
In this section, we show that quantum adversaries cannot find H-sequences of
lengthN using fewer thanN−1 steps, thereby showing the security of a construc-
tion for proof of sequential work in the parallel quantum random oracle model.
Recall that an H-sequence x0, x1, . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfies the property that for
each 0 ≤ i ≤ s − 1, there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that xi+1 = a ◦ H(xi) ◦ b.
Note that the sequence H(x), H2(x), . . . , HN(x) is an H-sequence, so in fact,
this proves that quantum adversaries are even more limited than being unable
to compute HN (x) for a given input x in fewer than N − 1 steps. In our anal-
ysis, we require that H outputs a λ-bit string but permit each term xi in the
H-sequence to have length δλ, for some variable parameter δ ≥ 1.
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We begin by introducing some helpful notation. Given a database D =
{(x1, y1), . . . , (xq , yq)} in the compressed standard oracle view, we can define
a directed graph GD on q nodes (vx1 , . . . , vxq ) so that there is an edge from node
vxi to node vxj if and only if there exist strings a, b such that xj = a ◦ yi ◦ b.
Thus, the graph GD essentially encodes possible H-sequences by forming edges
between nodes vxi and vxj if and only if yi is a substring of xj . More precisely,
given a path P = (vxi0 , vxi1 , . . . , vxik ) in GD, we define
– HSeq(P ) := (xi0 , xi1 , . . . , xik) denotes a corresponding H-sequence of length
k − 1, and
– LAST(P ) := vxik denotes the endpoint of the path P in GD which corre-
sponds to the output of the last label in the corresponding H-sequence.
We also define a predicate Substring(x, y) where Substring(x, y) = 1 if and only
if x is a substring of y, i.e., there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that y = a ◦ x ◦ b, and
Substring(x, y) = 0 otherwise.
Example 1. Suppose thatD = {(x1, y1), . . . , (x8, y8)} where (x1, y1) = (00000, 000),
(x2, y2) = (00010, 001), (x3, y3) = (00101, 010), (x4, y4) = (00110, 011), (x5, y5) =
(01001, 100), (x6, y6) = (01100, 101), (x7, y7) = (10010, 110), and (x8, y8) =
(11001, 111). We observe that the graph GD induced from the database D should
include the edge (v1, v2) since x2 = 00010 = y1 ◦ 10, and so forth. Then we have
the following graph GD in Figure 1, which includes an H-sequence of length
s = 5. In this example, we can say that for a path P = (v1, v2, v3, v5, v7, v8) of
length 5, we have a corresponding H-sequence HSeq(P ) = (x1, x2, x3, x5, x7, x8)
of length 5 since we have x2 = y1 ◦ 10, x3 = y2 ◦ 01, and so on. Note that in this
case we have LAST(P ) = v8.
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Fig. 1: A directed acyclic graph GD induced from the database D. We remark
that such H-sequence of length 5 is v1 → v2 → v3 → v5 → v7 → v8 which is
the longest path in the graph. We also remark that in this example, q = 8 = 2λ
implies λ = 3 and δλ = 5 where δ = 5/3 > 1.
Definition 5. We define PATHs to be the set of the databases (compressed ran-
dom oracles) D such that GD contains a path of length s.
PATHs := {D : GD contains a path of length s}.
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Note that PATHs intuitively corresponds to an H-sequence of length s. We also
define P˜ATHs to be the set of basis states with D in PATHs as follows:
P˜ATHs := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 : D ∈ PATHs}.
To bound the probability that a single round of queries finds an H-sequence
of length s+1 conditioned on the previous queries not finding an H-sequence of
length s, we consider the set of basis states {|Bi〉} of the form |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉⊗
|D〉, where D contains at most q−k entries and D /∈ PATHs. Let ψ =
∑
αi|Bi〉 be
an arbitrary state that is a linear combination of {|Bi〉} and let ψ′ = CPhsOk(ψ).
Then we would like to bound F2(ψ
′,PATHs+1), but there are substantial chal-
lenges in computing F2(ψ
′,PATHs+1) directly.
For example, given a decomposition of ψ =
∑
B αB|B〉 into basis states,
we might like to compute ηB = CPhsO
k(|B〉) for each basis state Bi and then
decompose ψ′ =
∑
B αBηB. However, the states ηB may no longer be orthogonal
and might interfere constructively/destructively. The challenges are amplified as
ψ′ is the result of k parallel queries, making it difficult to describe the state ψ′
in a helpful way.
Our approach is to consider an intermediate sequence of states ψ0 = ψ, . . . , ψk =
ψ′, where ψi intuitively encodes the state after the ith query is processed.
Then from the definition of CPhsOi, we have ψi+1 = Swap1,i+1 ◦ CPhsO ◦
Swap1,i+1(ψi) = SCPhsOi+1(ψi) for all i ∈ [k]. This approach presents a new
subtle challenge. Consider a basis state B = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉 ⊕ |D〉, where
the longest path in GD (the H-sequence) has length s− 1. We can easily argue
that F2(SCPhsO1(B), P˜ATHs+1) is negligible since the initial basis state B 6∈
P˜ATHs. Now we would like to argue that F2(SCPhsO2 ◦ SCPhsO1(B), P˜ATHs+1)
is negligibly small, but it is unclear how to prove this since we might have
F2(SCPhsO1(B), P˜ATHs) = 1, e.g., all of the datasets D found in the support of
SCPhsO1(B) have paths of length s.
Overcoming this barrier requires a much more careful definition of our “bad”
states. We introduce some new notions to make the explanations clearer. Suppose
that a database D /∈ PATHs. If D has no H-sequence of length s, it may not be
the case that ψi has no H-sequence of length s. However, the intuition is that
since the queries x1, . . . , xk are made in the same round, then it is acceptable to
have an H-sequence of length s, provided that the last entry in the H-sequence
involves some (xi, yi). Thus we define PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk) to be a set of the
databases with the induced graph GD having a path of length s that does not
end in a term that contains H(xi):
PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk) := {D : GD contains a path P of length s and
LAST(P ) /∈ {vx1 , . . . , vxi}},
where we recall that LAST(P ) denotes the endpoint of the path P in GD, which
corresponds to the output of the last label in the corresponding H-sequence as
defined before. We then define
PATHs,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 : D ∈ PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk)},
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which denotes the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the
set PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk).
Now we define a set Contains,i, which intuitively represents the set of databases
so that the queries correspond to the guesses for preimages:
Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk) := {D : ∃j ≤ k : Substring(D(xi), xj) = 1 and
GD contains a path of length s ending at xi}.
We then define
Contains,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 : D ∈ Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk)},
which denotes the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the
set Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk). Therefore, we define BADs,i to be the set of databases
that are not in PATHs but upon the insertion of (x1, y1), . . . , (xi, yi), is a member
of PATHs+1:
BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) := PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk) ∪
i⋃
j=1
Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk)
Finally, we define
BADs,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 : D ∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk)}
to represent the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the
set BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk).
We now process each query (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) sequentially and argue that
the mass projected onto PATHs+1 by each step CPhsO
i is negligible. To prove
this, we argue that F2(ψi,BADs,i) is negligible for all i ≤ k. We use the conven-
tion that ψ0 is the initial state and ψi = SCPhsOi(ψi−1) for all i ∈ [k] so that
ψk is the last state, after all the queries have been processed. Similarly, we use
the convention that BADs,0 = P˜ATHs.
We first give the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that D′ is the database such that D′(xi+1) = ⊥. If D =
D′ ∪ (xi+1, w) /∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk), then D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
Proof. Since D /∈ PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk), any path of length s must end at one of
vx1 , . . . , vxi . Hence, no path of length s ends at vxi+1 unless we have a duplicate
query xj = xi+1 for some j < i+ 1. Now we have two cases:
(1) If xi+1 is distinct from xj for all j < i + 1, then by the previous observa-
tion we immediately have that D /∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Furthermore, GD
contains no path of length s ending at node vxi+1 since any path of length s
must end at one of vx1 , . . . , vxi . Hence, D /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Taken
together, we have that D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
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(2) If xi+1 = xj (j < i + 1) is a duplicate query, then there might be a path of
length s ending at vxi+1 = vxj in D. However, due to the duplicate we have
{vx1 , . . . , vxi} = {vx1 , . . . , vxi+1}. Therefore, D /∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
Now we want to argue thatD /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Note thatD(xi+1) =
D(xj) for some j < i+ 1, which implies that
Substring(D(xj), xl) = Substring(D(xi+1), xl)
for all l ∈ [k]. If D ∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk), then there exists a path of
length s ending at xj and Substring(D(xj), xl) = 1 for some l ≤ k. This im-
plies that D ∈ Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk) and therefore D ∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk),
which is a contradiction. Hence, we have that D /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk)
and therefore D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) in this case as well.
Taken together, we can conclude that if D /∈ PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk), then it is also
the case that D /∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1},
F2(ψi+1,BADs,i+1)− F2(ψi,BADs,i) ≤ 10(qδλ+ kδλ)
2
2λ
.
Proof. To argue that the projection onto PATHs+1 increases by a negligible
amount for each query, we use a similar argument to [Zha19]. Recall that SCPhsOi+1 =
Swap1,i+1◦CPhsO◦Swap1,i+1. Namely, we decompose ψi into states ψ =
∑ |x, y, z〉⊗∑
D αD|D〉 and consider the projection of ψi+1 = SCPhsOi+1(ψi) onto orthogo-
nal spaces as follows:
– We first define Pi to be the projection onto the span of basis states |x, y, z〉⊗
|D〉 ∈ BADs,i and P to be the projection onto the span of basis states in
BADs,i+1.
– Next we define Qi to be the projection onto states |x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 such that
|x, y, z〉⊗|D〉 /∈ BADs,i, yi+1 6= 0 and D(xi+1) = ⊥. Intuitively, Qi represents
the projection on states with potentially bad databases where SCPhsOi+1
will affect D and the value of xi+1 has not been specified in D.
– We then define Ri to be the projection onto states |x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 such that
|x, y, z〉⊗ |D〉 /∈ BADs,i, yi+1 6= 0 and D(xi+1) 6= ⊥, so that the value of xi+1
has been specified in databases corresponding to these states.
– Finally, we define Si to be the projection onto states |x, y, z〉⊗ |D〉 such that
|x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D〉 /∈ BADs,i and yi+1 = 0.
Since Pi, Qi, Ri, Si project onto disjoint states that span the entirety of ψi+1
then we have Pi+Qi+Ri+Si = I. We analyze how P acts on these components
separately.
(1) We first observe that ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Pi · ψi)‖2 ≤ ‖Pi · ψi‖2 as SCPhsOi+1
is a unitary transform.
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(2) We then analyze how P acts upon the states of SCPhsOi+1(Qi ·ψi). Note that
SCPhsOi+1 maps such basis states to |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉⊗
∑
w 2
−λ/2|D∪
(xi+1, w)〉. We thus consider a classical argument to analyze the number of
strings w such that the states above are in BADs,i+1. Recall that
BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) := PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) ∪
i+1⋃
j=1
Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk).
– Thus we first consider the databases that have a path of length s that
includes but does not end at w. For a particular string x ∈ {0, 1}δλ (e.g.,
any random oracle input s.t. D(x) 6= ⊥) , x contains at most δλ unique
contiguous substrings of length λ, so there are at most δλ values of w
such that there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ with y = a◦w◦b. Since |D∪(xi+1, w)〉
consists of databases with at most q entries, then by a union bound, there
are at most qδλ such w in total.
– We now bound the number of databases in
⋃i+1
j=1 Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk).
Recall that the queries x1, . . . , xi+1 are parallel, so that we can consider
x1, . . . , xi+1 independently, which would not be the case if the queries
were sequential. For a fixed j, there are at most δλ unique substrings of
length λ in xj . Thus taking a union bound over all indices j ∈ [i + 1],
there are at most kδλ values of w such that Substring(w,D(xj)).
Hence, we have
‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Qi · ψi)‖22 ≤
qδλ+ kδλ
2λ
.
(3) We next consider how P acts upon the states of SCPhsOi+1(Ri · ψi). From
algebraic manipulation similar to [Zha19], we have that if D′ is the database
D with xi removed, then SCPhsOi+1(|x, y, z〉⊗|D′∪(xi+1, w)〉) can be written
as
|(x1, y1), . . . ,(xk, yk), z〉 ⊗
(
(−1)yi+1·w
(
|D′ ∪ (xi+1, w)〉 + 1
2λ/2
|D′〉
)
+
1
2λ
∑
w
∑
w′
(1− (−1)yi+1·w − (−1)yi+1·w′)|D′ ∪ (xi+1, w′)〉
)
.
Observe that since D = |D′∪(xi+1, w)〉 6∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) then either GD
does not contain a path of length s ending with node vxi+1 or xi+1 = xj for
some j ≤ i. In either case, we have D 6∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) by Lemma 5.
Similarly, it follows that D′ 6∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Thus, we can simplify
our above equation after applying the projection P :
P · SCPhsOi+1(|x, y, z〉 ⊗ |D′ ∪ (xi+1, w)〉) = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉⊗( 1
2λ
∑
w
∑
w′:D′∪(xi+1,w
′)〉∈
BADs,i+1(x1,...,xk)
(1 − (−1)yi+1·w − (−1)yi+1·w′)|D′ ∪ (xi+1, w′)〉
)
.
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It is helpful to write
Ri · ψi =
∑
x,y,z,D′,w
αx,y,z,D′,w|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D′ ∪ (xi+1, w)〉
where we use x = (x1, ..., xk) and y = (y1, . . . , yk) to simplify notation in
the subscripts. Thus we have that ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Ri · ψi)‖22 can be upper
bounded by:
1
4λ
∑
x,y,z,D′
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
w
αx,y,z,D′,w
∑
w′:D′∪(xi+1,w
′)∈
BADs,i+1(x1,...,xk)
(1 − (−1)yi+1·w − (−1)yi+1·w′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
.
Now we once again use a classical counting argument to upper bound the
number of strings w′ such that D′ ∪ (xi+1, w′) ∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
– We first bound the databases D′ that have a path of length s that does
not end at w′. Any fixed y ∈ D′ contains at most δλ unique contiguous
substrings of length λ, so there are at most δλ values of w′ such that
y = a ◦w′ ◦ b for some a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗. Taking a union bound over at most
q possible values of y ∈ D′, there are at most qδλ such w′ in total.
– We next bound the databases D′ in ⋃i+1j=1 Contains,j . For a fixed j, there
are at most δλ unique contiguous substrings of length λ in xj . Taking a
union bound over at most i ≤ k indices j, there are at most kδλ values
w′ such that D(xj) = a ◦ w′ ◦ b for some a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Hence,
‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Ri · ψi)‖22 ≤
1
4λ
∑
x,y,z,D′
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
w
αx,y,z,D′,w3(qδλ+ kδλ)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ 1
2λ
∑
x,y,z,D′,w
‖αx,y,z,D′,w3(qδλ+ kδλ)‖22
=
9(qδλ+ kδλ)2
2λ
∑
x,y,z,D′,w
‖αx,y,z,D′,w‖22
=
9(qδλ+ kδλ)2
2λ
‖Ri · ψi‖22
(4) We finally observe that P · SCPhsOi+1(Si · ψi) = 0 since for any basis state
|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 state in the support of Si · ψi we have
SCPhsOi+1|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉 = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉 ⊗ |D〉
i.e., SCPhsOi+1(Si·ψi) = Si·ψi. We also note that sinceD 6∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk)
and xi+1 is not being inserted into the dataset that D 6∈ BADs,i+1. Hence,
‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Si · ψi)‖2 = 0.
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Thus from orthogonality, we have
‖P · SCPhsOi+1(ψi)‖22 ≤ ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Pi · ψi)‖22 + ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Qi · ψi)‖22
+ ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Ri · ψi)‖22 + ‖P · SCPhsOi+1(Si · ψi)‖22
≤ ‖Pi · ψi‖22 +
9(qδλ+ kδλ)2
2λ
+
qδλ+ kδλ
2λ
≤ 10(qδλ+ kδλ)
2
2λ
.
Since we have that ‖P · SCPhsOi(ψi)‖22 = F2(ψi+1,BADs,i+1) and ‖Pi · ψi‖22 =
F2(ψi,BADs,i), we can conclude that F2(ψi+1,BADs,i+1) − F2(ψi,BADs,i) ≤
10(qδλ+kδλ)2
2λ . ⊓⊔
We now bound the probability that a single round of queries finds anH-sequence
of length s+1 conditioned on the previous queries not finding an H-sequence of
length s.
Lemma 7. Let ψ0 be an initial state with F2(ψ0, P˜ATHs) = 0 and let ψk =
CPhsOk(ψ) then F2(ψ
′, P˜ATHs+1) ≤ 10k(qδλ+kδλ)
2
2λ
.
Proof. We consider the sequence of states ψ0, . . . , ψk with ψi = CPhsO
i(ψ).
We first note that F2(ψk,BADs,k) ≤ F2(ψk, P˜ATHs+1) so it suffices to bound
F2(ψk, P˜ATHs+1). To see this, consider any basis state |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z〉⊗
|D〉 in the support of ψk and let D′ be the same dataset with any entries of the
form (xi, wi) removed. We remark that D′ 6∈ PATHs since F2(ψ0, P˜ATHs) = 0. It
follows that if D ∈ PATHs+1 then D ∈ BADs,k(x1, . . . , xk). In particular, if the
last edge of any path of length s+1 in GD takes the form (vxi , vxj ). This implies
that xj contains D(xi) as a substring and there is a path of length s ending at
vxi , so that D ∈ Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk). On the other hand, if the last edge is
(vx, vxj ) with x 6∈ {x1, . . . , xk}, then there is a path of length s ending at node
vx, so D ∈ PATHs,k(x1, . . . , xk).
Recall that we use the convention BADs,0 = P˜ATHs and ψ0 is the initial
state, which satisfies F2(ψ0,PATHs) = 0 by assumption. Thus F2(ψ0,BADs,0) =
F2(ψ0, P˜ATHs) = 0, so that by Lemma 6,
F2(ψk,BADs,k) = F2(ψ0,BADs,0) +
k−1∑
i=0
F2(ψi+1,BADs,i+1)− F2(ψi,BADs,i)
≤
k−1∑
i=0
10(qδλ+ kδλ)2
2λ
=
10k(qδλ+ kδλ)2
2λ
. ✷
We now show that a quantum adversary that makes up to q rounds over N − 1
rounds can only find an H-sequence of length N with negligible probability.
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Lemma 8. Suppose that in each round i ∈ [N − 1] the adversary A makes
a query to the parallel oracle CPhsOki and that the total number of queries is
bounded by q, i.e.,
∑N−1
i=1 ki ≤ q. Then A measures a database in PATHN with
probability at most 4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ
.
Proof. Let ψ0 be the initial state and define ψr = Ur · CPhsOkr (ψr−1) for
each round r ∈ [N − 1]. Thus, the attacker A yields a sequence of states
ψ0, . . . , ψN−1. Here, Ur represents a unitary transform applied by A in between
batches of queries to the quantum oracle. We remark that Ur may only oper-
ate on the registers |x, y, z〉 and cannot impact the compressed oracle D, e.g., Ur ·
(|x, y, z〉 ⊕ |D〉)) =∑x′,y′,z′ αx,y,z|x, y, z〉⊕|D〉. Thus F2(Ur·CPhsOkr (ψr−1), P˜ATHr+1) =
F2(CPhsO
kr (ψr−1), P˜ATHr+1), so we can effectively ignore the intermediate uni-
tary transform Ur in our analysis below.
Let ζr = F2(ψr,PATHr+1) for each r ∈ [N − 1]. We want to argue that any
measurement of the final state ψN−1 fails to reveal a database D ∈ PATHN with
overwhelming probability.
We first provide a high level overview of our proof. We begin by defining
an alternate sequence φ0, . . . , φN−1 such that φ0 := ψ0, F2(φr, P˜ATHr+1) = 0
and φN−1 is indististinguishable from ψN−1. More specifically, we will show that
φr = UrCPhsO
kr (ψr−1)+Er, where each error term Er has small norm. We will
then apply Lemma 1 to argue that the Euclidean distance between ψN−1 and
ψN−1 is small. Because F2(φN−1, P˜ATHN ) = 0, a measurement of φN−1 cannot
reveal a database D ∈ PATHN . Indistinguishability implies that the probability
of finding a database D ∈ PATHN must also be small when measuring ψN−1.
Let φ0 = ψ0 and, once φr−1 has been defined, we let Ur · CPhsOkrφr−1 =∑
B αB,r|B〉 and ζr := F2(Ur · CPhsOkrφr−1, P˜ATHr+1) for each r ≤ N − 1. We
can now define
φr =
√
1
1− ζr
∑
|B〉/∈P˜ATHr+1
αB,r|B〉.
Intuitively, φr is very close to Ur · CPhsOkrφr−1 except that we drop any bad
states
∑
|B〉∈PATHr+1
αB,r|B〉 and renormalize. We can then define Er := φr −
Ur ·CPhsOkrφr−1 to ensure that φr = Ur ·CPhsOkrφr−1+Er, where Er denotes
our error term. We now want to bound ‖Er‖22. We first note that
Er =
√
1
1− ζr
∑
|B〉/∈P˜ATHr+1
αB,r|B〉 −
∑
B
αB,r|B〉
=
(√
1
1− ζr − 1
) ∑
|B〉/∈P˜ATHr+1
αB,r|B〉 −
∑
B∈P˜ATHr+1
αB,r|B〉 .
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Thus, it follows that
‖Er‖22 =
(√
1
1− ζr − 1
)2 ∑
|B〉/∈P˜ATHr+1
|αB,r|2 +
∑
B∈P˜ATHr+1
|αB,r|2
=
(
1−√1− ζr√
1− ζr
)2
(1 − ζr) + ζr
= 2− 2
√
1− ζr ≤ 2ζr .
The last inequality above follows since 1−√1− x ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Applying
Lemma 7, we have ‖Er‖22 ≤ 20kr(qδλ+krδλ)
2
2λ
≤ 80krq2δ2λ2
2λ
.
Observe that ψ0 = φ0. By Lemma 3, it follows that the Euclidean distance
between ψr+1 and φr+1 is at most (r + 1)
√
ζr+1 ≤ (r + 1)
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ . Taking
r = N − 1, then it follows that the Euclidean distance between ψN−1 and
φN−1 is at most N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ
. Moreover, if we observe a state in φN−1, then
the database will not be in PATHN . Hence by Lemma 1, the probability that a
database in PATHN is found when measuring the original state ψN−1 is at most
4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ
. ⊓⊔
Thus we have shown that a quantum adversary that makes N − 1 rounds
of parallel queries should generally not find an H-sequence of length N within
their queries. Then we bound the probability that the quantum adversary out-
puts an H-sequence of length N by a standard approach, e.g. [CP18,Zha19] of
additionally the probability that the quantum adversary makes a “lucky guess”.
Reminder of Theorem 2. A quantum adversary that makes at most q queries
over all N − 1 rounds can only find an H-sequence of length N with probability
at most 4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ +
δλ
2λ .
Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemma 8, the probability that the quantum ad-
versary makes a set of q queries across N − 1 rounds that reveals an H-sequence
of length N is at most 4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ .
Supposing that the measured database (compressed random oracle) D does
not contain an H-sequence, then for any candidate H-sequence x0, . . . , xN pro-
posed by the adversary, there exists an index i ∈ [N − 1] such that D(xi) = ⊥
or for which D(xi) is not a consecutive substring of xi+1. In the latter case,
x0, . . . , xN is simply an invalid H-sequence, so we assume that D(xi) = ⊥ with-
out loss of generality. In this case, we can treat y = D(xi) as a fresh (uniformly
random) string in {0, 1}λ. The probability that xi+1 contains y is at most δλ2λ as
there are at most δλ substrings of xi+1.
Thus, the total probability that the quantum adversary finds an H-sequence
of length N is at most 4N
√
80q3δ2λ2
2λ +
δλ
2λ . ✷
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5 Conclusion
We have shown that any attacker in the parallel quantum random oracle model
making q ≪ 2λ/3 total queries cannot find an H-sequence of length N in N − 1
sequential rounds except with negligible probability. We leave it as an open
question to determine whether or not a quantum attacker can produce an H-
sequence of length N in sequential time N − 1 when making at most q ≥ 2λ/3
queries. Our results provide strong evidence the prior constructions of proofs of
sequential work are post-quantum secure. Our results also highlight the power
of the recent compressed random oracle technique of Zhandry [Zha19]. One key
challenge would be to see if these techniques could be extended to establish the
security of important cryptographic primitives such as memory-hard functions
or proofs of space in the quantum random oracle model. For example, Alwen and
Serbinenko [AS15] previously gave a classical pebbling reduction in the classical
parallel random oracle model showing that the cumulative memory complexity
of a data-independent memory hard function is tightly characterized by the
pebbling complexity of the underlying graph. Would it be possible to establish
the post-quantum security of memory hard functions through a similar reduction
in the quantum random oracle model?
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A Sequentially Bounded Quantum Attackers
In this section, we show that a quantum attacker with a specific upper bound on
running time cannot compute the output of a sequential function in significantly
fewer steps, with high probability. Namely, we show that for a hash function H
and a difficulty parameter N , a quantum adversary that can make q quantum
queries to the random oracle cannot compute HN(x) in fewer than N − 1 steps,
with high probability. To make this argument, we construct a sequence of hy-
brids, so that in each hybrid only differs on a small subset of inputs from the
previous hybrid, so that the Euclidean distance between the final states of a se-
quence of operations of the hybrids must be small. It then follows that with high
probability, the first hybrid (the real world sampler), with high probability, can-
not be distinguished from the final hybrid, in which the adversary information
theoretically cannot find HN (x).
We first describe the real-world sampler.
Real-World Sampler
Let λ > 0 and H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}4λ be a uniform random hash function.
Input: |x, y〉, where x and y have the same length and are up to 4λ qubits.
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(1) Output |x, y ⊕H(x)〉.
Given an input x, let ℓi(x) = H
i(x) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Define a series of hybrids
as follows. We first replace the real world sampler with a hybrid that does not
return any collisions among ℓ1, . . . , ℓN .
Hybrid 0
Fix a distinguished x′ and letH be a hash function such that {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓN}
are distinct.
Input: |x, y〉, where x and y have the same length and are up to 4w qubits.
(1) Output |x, y ⊕H(x)〉.
In the first hybrid, we replace H(x) in the first round, but otherwise use H(x)
in the remaining rounds.
Hybrid 1
Fix a distinguished x′ and letH be a hash function such that {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓN}
are distinct. Let r1, r2, . . . , rN be a set of distinct random strings uniformly
drawn from {0, 1}4λ. Let G1(x) be defined as follows:
G1(x) =
{
H(x), x /∈ {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓN}
ri, x = ℓi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Input: |x, y〉, where x and y have the same length and are up to 4λ qubits.
(1) If query is made in Round 1, output |x, y ⊕G1(x)〉.
(2) If query is made in Round i, where i > 1, output |x, y ⊕H(x)〉.
We then similarly define a sequence of hybrids in the following manner:
Hybrid i
Fix a distinguished x′ and letH be a hash function such that {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓN}
are distinct. Let r1, r2, . . . , rN be a set of distinct random strings uniformly
drawn from {0, 1}4λ. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ i, define function Gj(x) by:
Gj(x) =
{
H(x), x /∈ {ℓi, ℓi+1, . . . , ℓN}
rj , x = ℓj , i ≤ j ≤ N.
Input: |x, y〉, where x and y have the same length and are up to 4λ qubits.
(1) If query is made in Round j, where j ≤ i, output |x, y ⊕Gj(x)〉.
(2) Otherwise, output |x, y ⊕H(x)〉.
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A.1 Indistinguishability of Hybrids
In this section, we bound the Euclidean distance between the final states of
the hybrids. The crucial observation is that by design, the hybrids only differ
on a small subset of inputs, so then the Euclidean distance between the final
states of a sequence of operations of the hybrids must be small. Thus with high
probability, the real world sampler cannot be distinguished from the hybrids.
Lemma 9. For each i ∈ [N ], define UNIQUEi as the event that labels ℓ1, . . . , ℓi
are all distinct and UNIQUE as the event UNIQUEN . Then Pr [UNIQUE] ≥ 1−
N2
24λ .
Proof. Consider the conditional probabilityPr [UNIQUEi+1 |UNIQUEi] = 1− i24λ
for any fixed i. Thus,
Pr [UNIQUEN ] =
N−1∏
i=1
Pr [UNIQUEi+1 |UNIQUEi] =
N−1∏
i=1
(
1− i
24λ
)
≥ 1−
N−1∑
i=1
i
24λ
≥ 1− N
2
24λ
. ✷
First, note that the real world sampler is indistinguishable from hybrid 0 condi-
tioned on the event UNIQUE.
Lemma 10. Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1. Let A be any attacker in the parallel quantum
random oracle model. Then conditioned on the event UNIQUE, the probability
that in hybrid j, A returns ℓN in round j is at most 124λ−N .
Proof. Note that in hybrid j, the label ℓN−1 remains hidden to A in an informa-
tion theoretic sense, e.g., even if the attacker has access to the full truth table
of Gj . Conditioned on the event that ℓi 6= ℓj for any i 6= j, the attacker A only
knows that ℓN−1 is not one of the labels ℓ1, . . . , ℓN−2 and thus only knows that
hybrid j is one of 24λ −N +2 strings, so the probability that a measurement of
a single quantum query of hybrid j matches ℓN is less than
1
24λ−N
. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 3. Let φ = ∑αx|x〉 be the superposition of a
quantum query that an adversary A chooses. Let ξx be the squared magnitude of
a state x in which hybrid j answers differently than hybrid j + 1. Then over the
choices of all hash functions H,
Pr
[∑
ξx >
1
22λ
]
<
10w
22λ
.
Proof. The proof follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 10. Observe that hybrid
j and hybrid j + 1 only answers differently on input ℓj+1. Since ℓj+1 is a string
in {0, 1}4λ, the probability that Gj(x) = ℓj+1 for a specific (classical) input x
is 1
24λ
. Given a 4λ length qubit ψ, let S be the set of states with probability at
least 1
22λ
. Observe that if Gj(x) = ℓj+1 for any x ∈ S, then the magnitude of x
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is greater than 1
22λ
by definition of S. But since |S| < 22λ, the probability that
there exists some x ∈ S such that Gj(x) = ℓj+1 is at most 22λ24λ = 122λ by a simple
union bound.
On the other hand, Chernoff bounds imply that there are greater than 9λ
values y ∈ {0, 1}4λ such that Gj(y) = ℓj+1 only with probability less than 122λ .
By definition, any state not in S has probability at most 122λ , and so the sum of
the magnitudes of any y with Gj(y) = ℓj+1 but y /∈ S is at most 9λ22λ .
Thus,
Pr
[∑
ξx >
1
22λ
]
<
9λ+ 1
22λ
≤ 10λ
22λ
. ✷
From applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 11, we can obtain an upper bound on
the Euclidean distance between the final states of hybrid i and hybrid i+ 1.
Lemma 12. Conditioned on the event UNIQUE, the total variation distance be-
tween the final states of hybrid i and hybrid i+ 1 is at most
√
160λT
22λ
.
Proof. Let r be a state in which hybrid j answers differently than hybrid j + 1.
By Lemma 11,
∑
(t,r) qr(|φt〉) ≤ 10λ22λ for a fixed t. Summing over all j timesteps,
it follows that
∑
(t,r) qr(|φt〉) ≤ 10λN22λ . Then by applying Lemma 2, the Euclidean
distance between the final states of hybrid i and hybrid i+1 is at most
√
10λT
22λ
.
Thus by Lemma 1, the total variation distance is at most
√
160λT
22λ
. ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. Conditioned on UNIQUE, the total variation distance between the
final states of the Real World Sampler and hybrid i is at most
√
160λN2T
22λ
for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.
Proof. Conditioned on UNIQUE, the total variation distance between the final
states of hybrid i and hybrid i + 1 is at most
√
160λT
22λ
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 3
by Lemma 12. By repeatedly invoking the triangle inequality, the total variation
distance between the final states of the real world sampler and hybrid i is at
most
√
160λN2T
22λ
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1, conditioned on UNIQUE. ⊓⊔
Reminder of Theorem 1. Given a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}4λ
and a random input x, any quantum attacker that makes up to q queries in
each of N − 1 sequential steps can only compute HN (x) with probability at most
N2
24λ
+ 1
24λ−N
+
√
160λN4q2T
22λ
in the quantum parallel random oracle model.
Proof of Theorem 1: First, observe that UNIQUE occurs with probability
at least 1 − N2
24λ
by Lemma 9. Conditioned on the event UNIQUE, any history
revealing attacker in hybrid N − 1 outputs ℓN with probability at most 124λ−N
by Lemma 10. Moreover, we claim that conditioned on UNIQUE occurring, the
real world sampler is indistinguishable from any hybrid.
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Specifically, by Lemma 13, the real world sampler and hybrid N have total
variation distance at most
√
160λN2T
22λ and thus only differ on
√
160λN2T
22λ fraction
of inputs. Since hybrid N − 1 makes at most qN queries in total, the real world
sampler differs in at most
√
160λN4q2T
22λ
outputs.
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − N2
24λ
− 1
24λ−N
−
√
160λN4q2T
22λ
, in the
qROM, any quantum attacker making q queries per step (modeled by the real
world sampler) requires at least N − 1 steps. ✷
B Full Description of StdDecomp
x
Here we give a formal definition of the local decompression procedure StdDecompx
for a given x [Zha19]. Let D be a database with a collection of (x, y) pairs and
|τ〉 be a uniform superposition. If (x, y) ∈ D, we write D(x) = y and if no such
pair is in D for an input x, then we write D(x) = ⊥. Given an upper bound t on
the number of set points, StdDecompx is defined based on the following cases:
(1) If D(x) = ⊥ and |D| < t, then
StdDecompx|D〉 =
1√
2λ
∑
y
|D ∪ (x, y)〉,
inserting the pair (x, |τ〉) into D which means that StdDecompx decompresses
the value of D at x.
(2) If D(x) = ⊥ and |D| = t, then
StdDecompx|D〉 = |D〉,
which means that StdDecompx does nothing when there is no room for de-
compression.
(3) If D(x) 6= ⊥ and |D〉 = 1√
2λ
∑
y
(−1)z·y|D′ ∪ (x, y)〉 where D′(x) = ⊥ and
|D′| < t, then
StdDecompx|D〉 =
{ |D〉 if z 6= 0,
|D′〉 if z = 0.
That means that if D is already specified on x and the corresponding y
registers are in a state orthogonal to a uniform superposition (z 6= 0) then
StdDecompx does nothing since there is no need to decompress. If y registers
are in the state of a uniform superposition (z = 0) then StdDecompx removes
(x, y) from D.
C Alternative Compressed Oracle Technique to the
pqROM
In this section, we introduce an alternative approach to extend CPhsO to the
pqROM. Recall that to extend the compressed oracle technique [Zha19] to the
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pqROM, we need to redefine StdDecomp and CPhsO that can handle multiple
queries as input. For the input that takes k queries in a round, i.e., the input that
takes the form |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉, the parallel local decompression procedure
StdDecompk can be defined as
StdDecomp
k|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉⊗|D〉 = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉⊗
(
k∏
j=1
StdDecompxj
)
|D〉,
such that we apply StdDecomp for each xi’s and make a product on it. Similarly,
the parallel compressed phase oracle CPhsOk is defined over the computational
basis states as
CPhsO′k|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉⊗|D〉 = (−1)
∑k
j=1 yj ·D(xj)|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉⊗|D〉
and
CPhsOk = StdDecompk ◦ CPhsO′k ◦ StdDecompk ◦ Increasek,
where Increasek is the procedure which initializes k new registers |(⊥, 0n), . . . , (⊥, 0n)〉
and appends it to the end of each database in a parallel query round.
